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Abstract
This paper introduces a form of boundedly-rational expectations into an otherwise
standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The representative agent￿ s forecast rule is optimal
(in the sense of minimizing mean squared forecast errors), conditional on a perceived law
of motion for in￿ ation and observed moments of the in￿ ation time series. The perceived
law of motion allows for both temporary and permanent shocks to in￿ ation, the latter
intended to capture the possibility of evolving shifts in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target.
In this case, the agent￿ s optimal forecast rule de￿ned by the Kalman ￿lter coincides with
adaptive expectations, as shown originally by Muth (1960). I show that the perceived
optimal value of the gain parameter assigned to the last observed in￿ ation rate is given by
the ￿xed point of a nonlinear map that relates the gain parameter to the autocorrelation of
in￿ ation changes. The model allows for either a constant gain or variable gain, depending
on the length of the sample period used by the agent to compute the autocorrelation of
in￿ ation changes. In the variable-gain setup, the equilibrium law of motion for in￿ ation
is nonlinear and can generate time-varying in￿ ation dynamics similar to those observed
in long-run U.S. data. The model￿ s in￿ ation dynamics are driven solely by white-noise
fundamental shocks propagated via the expectations feedback mechanism; all monetary
policy-dependent parameters are held constant.
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1.1 Overview
The standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is derived most straightforwardly from
Calvo￿ s (1983) model of sticky price adjustment. Under rational expectations, the Calvo model
implies that the equilibrium in￿ ation rate is nearly a jump variable. Numerous researchers
have criticized the standard NKPC on grounds that a reasonably parameterized version fails
to capture important features of post-World War II U.S. data, namely, high levels of in￿ ation
persistence and the delayed and gradual response of in￿ ation to unanticipated monetary policy
shocks.1 E⁄orts to ￿￿x up￿the standard NKPC have generally involved the introduction of
lagged in￿ ation (or some function thereof) into the equilibrium law of motion. Modi￿ed
versions of the NKPC have been motivated by the presence of some backward-looking agents
(Roberts 1997, Gal￿ and Gertler 1999), alternative wage contracts (Buiter and Jewitt 1981,
Fuhrer and Moore 1995), the use of backward-looking price indexation by ￿rms (Woodford
2003, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005), sticky information adjustment (Mankiw and
Reis 2002), learning or signal extraction about the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target or other
fundamentals (Erceg and Levin 2003, Collard and Dellas 2005), and continuously evolving but
nevertheless unanticipated shifts in the in￿ ation target (Kozicki and Tinsley 2002, Cogley and
Sbordone 2005).
While modi￿ed versions of the NKPC have achieved varying degrees of success in matching
the data, most continue to rely on some argument that agents fail to optimize in an important
way or, alternatively, su⁄er from the drawback that agents will eventually learn the underlying
fundamentals that govern their environment, thus restoring the full-information, rational ex-
pectations solution. The model developed in this paper is intended to address such criticisms,
at least in part. I develop a boundedly-rational NKPC that can produce time-varying in￿ ation
dynamics similar to those observed in long-run U.S. data. The model employs the concept of
a ￿consistent expectations equilibrium￿described by Hommes and Sorger (1998). In this type
of equilibrium, the representative agent￿ s forecast rule is parameterized to match the observed
correlation structure of the forecast variable. The resulting forecast errors exhibit near-zero
autocorrelation at all lags, rendering it di¢ cult for the agent to detect a misspeci￿cation of the
forecast rule. This is closely related to the concept of a ￿restricted perceptions equilibrium￿
described by Evans and Honkopohja (2001). In this type of equilibrium, the agent￿ s forecast
rule is optimized (in the sense of minimizing mean squared forecast errors) for a perceived law
of motion that does not nest the actual law of motion as a special case.
Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) were among the ￿rst to call attention to the dramatic
changes in in￿ ation persistence in long-run U.S. data. Barsky (p. 3) noted that ￿[i]in￿ ation
evolved from essentially a white noise process in the pre-World War I years, to a highly
persistent, non-stationary ARIMA process in the post-1960 period.￿ More recently, Cogley
and Sargent (2001, 2005) employ vector autoregressions that allow for drifting coe¢ cients
and stochastic volatility to document the evolving nature of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics in post-
World War II data. Their methodology identi￿es a positive correlation between measures of
persistence, volatility, and the level of in￿ ation in post-World War II data. Simple 20-year
rolling summary statistics con￿rm these basic ￿ndings. As a caveat, it should be noted that
1See, for example, Roberts (1997, 2005), Fuhrer (1997, 2005), Mankiw (2001), and Rudd and Whelan (2005a,
2005b), among others.
1￿ndings of time-varying in￿ ation persistence in recent data are not universal. Pivetta and Reis
(2004) argue that the wide con￿dence intervals around measures of in￿ ation persistence do
not allow one to reject the hypothesis of no change in persistence since 1965. These authors
do ￿nd robust evidence of a decline in in￿ ation volatility, however.
Shifts in monetary policy are an obvious candidate for explaining changes in in￿ ation
dynamics. Both Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) attribute the change in in￿ ation persistence
after World War I to the abandonment of the classical gold standard. A gold standard can
be viewed as a price-level targeting regime. Under an in￿ ation-targeting regime, shifts in the
central bank￿ s in￿ ation target (which determines the trend in￿ ation rate) can distort standard
measures of persistence and volatility. For this reason, measures of persistence and volatility
should be conditioned on an estimate of trend in￿ ation.2 In computing the 20-year rolling
summary statistics, I control for shifts in trend in￿ ation by ￿rst extracting the low-frequency
component of U.S. in￿ ation. Detrended in￿ ation continues to exhibit time-varying patterns of
persistence and volatility, even during periods of seemingly-unchanged monetary policy, such
as the sample period since 1995. Such observations suggest that U.S. in￿ ation is driven by a
number of di⁄erent nonlinearities, not just those attributable to policy regime shifts.
In the model, the representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion allows for both temporary
and permanent shocks to in￿ ation, the latter intended to capture the possibility of evolving
shifts in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target. In this case, the agent￿ s optimal forecast rule
de￿ned by the Kalman ￿lter coincides with adaptive expectations, as shown originally by
Muth (1960). I show that the perceived optimal value of the gain parameter assigned to the
last observed in￿ ation rate is given by the ￿xed point of a nonlinear map that relates the
gain parameter to the autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes. By computing the value of the
autocorrelation coe¢ cient, the agent can identify the ￿signal-to-noise ratio,￿which measures
the relative variances of the permanent and temporary shocks to in￿ ation. A higher signal-
to-noise ratio calls for a higher gain parameter which, in turn, places more weight on recent
in￿ ation data in the agent￿ s forecast rule.
The model allows for either a constant gain or variable gain, depending on the length of
the sample period used by the agent to identify the signal-to-noise ratio from the observed
autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes. As the sample period becomes in￿nitely long, the equi-
librium yields a constant gain. A rolling sample period yields a variable gain. In either setup,
the agent￿ s forecast errors are close to white noise. In the variable-gain setup, the equilib-
rium law of motion for in￿ ation is nonlinear and therefore capable of generating stochastic
persistence and volatility. This version of the model can also generate positive skewness, ex-
cess kurtosis, and episodes where measures of persistence, volatility, and the level of in￿ ation
exhibit positive correlation with each other. All of these features are present in long-run U.S.
in￿ ation data. From the agent￿ s perspective, the use of a variable-gain forecasting algorithm
is justi￿ed by movements in the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. The model￿ s methodology
for identifying the perceived signal-to-noise ratio can also be applied directly to U.S. in￿ ation
data. The U.S. signal-to-noise ratio identi￿ed in this way exhibits an upward drift during the
1970s, followed by downward drift from the mid-1990s onwards. This pattern suggests that
the perceived signal-to-noise ratio might be viewed as a inverse measure of the Fed￿ s credibility
for maintaining a constant in￿ ation target.
In the model, the driving variable for in￿ ation can be interpreted as either the output gap
2This point has been emphasized by Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), Levin and Piger (2004), and Marques
(2004), among others.
2or real marginal cost. Monetary policy can operate implicitly through two channels: (i) the
trend in￿ ation rate around which the NKPC is log-linearized￿ assumed here to be zero, or
(ii) the parameters that govern the exogenous stochastic process for the driving variable. The
policy-dependent parameters are held constant throughout the analysis in order to isolate the
e⁄ects of expectational feedback on the dynamics of in￿ ation. Interestingly, the model can
generate pronounced low-frequency swings in the level of in￿ ation that have nothing to do
with changes in monetary policy. From the agent￿ s perspective, the observed low-frequency
swings justify the use of a forecast rule that allows for permanent shifts in the central bank￿ s
in￿ ation target. This feature of the model bears similarity to the ￿self-con￿rming equilibrium￿
concept described by Sargent (1999).
Introducing actual changes in monetary policy would add further complexity to the model￿ s
in￿ ation dynamics. In this regard, it should be noted that log-linearization of the Calvo
pricing equation around a non-zero trend in￿ ation rate would signi￿cantly alter the form of
the standard NKPC.3 The altered form of the NKPC is employed in the empirical studies
of Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) and Cogley and Sbordone (2005). These studies implicitly
assume that the agent in the model perceives the non-zero trend in￿ ation rate to be constant.
The model is then estimated using data which suggests that the actual trend in￿ ation rate
is shifting. By contrast, in the models of Erceg and Levin (2003) and Kozicki and Tinsley
(2005), both the perceived and actual trend in￿ ation rates shift over time. In this paper, the
agent￿ s perception is that the trend in￿ ation rate is shifting. This perception turns out to
be consistent with the agent￿ s observations (as measured by the low-frequency component of
in￿ ation), even though the actual trend in￿ ation rate in the model is held constant.
1.2 Other Related Literature
The use of boundedly-rational (or behavioral) in￿ ation expectations in macroeconomic models
is motivated by numerous empirical studies. Survey-based measures of U.S. in￿ ation expecta-
tions tend to systematically underpredict actual in￿ ation in the sample period prior to October
1979 and systematically overpredict it thereafter. Rational in￿ ation expectations would not
give rise a sustained sequence of one-sided forecast errors. Roberts (1997), Carroll (2003),
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004), Branch (2004), and Adam and Padula (2003) all ￿nd evi-
dence that survey-based measures of U.S. in￿ ation expectations do not make the most e¢ cient
use of available information.
The boundedly-rational form of adaptive expectations used here is similar to that explored
by Evans and Ramey (2006) in the context of the Lucas (1973) monetary policy model. In their
framework, the value of the gain parameter is pinned down using a Nash equilibrium concept,
but this turns out to coincide with the value implied by a particular restricted perceptions
equilibrium. Their analysis examines the importance of the Lucas critique in an economy with
monetary policy regime shifts.
An empirical study by Ball (2000) allows for a switch between two forms of ￿near-rational￿
forecast rules to help account for the dramatic change in U.S. in￿ ation persistence identi￿ed
by Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987). In Ball￿ s framework, the switch between forecast rules is
taken as given; it is not modeled as the endogenous outcome of an actual or perceived shift in
monetary policy.
3See Ascari (2004) and Sahuc (2006).
3Orphanides and Williams (2005) and Milani (2005) introduce in￿ ation persistence in the
form of constant-gain learning in models where the underlying fundamentals do not shift. The
representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion for in￿ ation is an AR(1) process with parameters
that are perpetually re-estimated using recent data. The value of the gain parameter in
the learning algorithm is calibrated rather than endogenized within the model itself. In the
learning model of Erceg and Levin (2003), the value of the gain parameter is estimated by
minimizing the squared deviations between the model￿ s in￿ ation expectations and survey-
based U.S. in￿ ation expectations.
Lastly, recent papers by Mash (2004) and Sheedy (2005) show that lagged in￿ ation can be
introduced into a fully-rational NKPC by replacing the Calvo-model assumption of a constant
probability of price change with a more-realistic assumption of a rising hazard function, i.e.,
the probability rises with the age of the price. It still appears to be the case, however,
that a reasonably-calibrated version of this setup fails to match the high levels of in￿ ation
persistence in post-World War II U.S. data. Moreover, Whelan (2006) shows that, like the
Calvo-model, the rising hazard function model predicts a counterfactual negative coe¢ cient on
lagged in￿ ation in reduced-form Phillips curve regressions. The rising hazard function model
also cannot account for the time-varying in￿ ation dynamics observed in U.S. data since 1995.
2 Time-Varying Persistence and Volatility in U.S. In￿ ation
Figure 1 provides evidence of time-varying persistence and volatility in long-run U.S. in￿ ation
data. The left-side panels plot the data and 20-year rolling summary statistics for CPI in￿ ation
from 1871.Q1 to 2004.Q4. The right-side panels plot the same information for GDP price
in￿ ation from 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4.4 The 20-year rolling summary statistics are computed for
both the raw and detrended in￿ ation series.5 As noted in the introduction, detrending is a
way to control for shifts in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target that have occurred over time.
Panel 1a illustrates the dramatic di⁄erence in the behavior of pre- and post-World War I
in￿ ation noted by Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987). The simple measure of persistence used
here is the 20-year rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient.6 Persistence hovers close to zero during
the pre-World War I era but then starts to increase around the year 1915 (panel 1c). There are
some notable variations in persistence over the ensuing decades, followed by a sharp drop in the
rolling autocorrelation towards the end of the sample. The end-of-sample drop in persistence
is also evident in GDP price in￿ ation (panel 1d).
4The annualized 1-quarter in￿ ation rate is given by 4log(Pt=Pt￿1); where Pt is the relevant price in-
dex. The quarterly CPI data were constructed by averaging monthly CPI data obtained from Robert
Shiller￿ s website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.htm. Shiller￿ s data employs the CPI-U
(Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1913
onward. For prior years, Shiller￿ s price index is constructed by splicing to monthly price data obtained
from Warren and Pearson (1935, Table 1, pp. 11￿ 14). Data on the quarterly GDP price index is from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCTPI.
5Thoroughout the paper, the in￿ ation trend is de￿ned as the low-frequency component of the data (￿ uctua-
tions longer than 32 quarters) extracted using the band pass ￿lter approximation of Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003). Similar results are obtained if the data are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600.
6Another commonly-used measure of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients in a univariate
regression. In the case of an AR(2) with coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2; we have Corr(￿t;￿t￿1) = ￿1=(1 ￿ ￿2): Thus,
both measures of persistence are increasing in ￿1 and ￿2:
4Figure 1: Long-run U.S. in￿ ation data and 20-year rolling summary statistics
Volatility is measured by the 20-year rolling standard deviation. The volatility of CPI
in￿ ation declines steadily from the early part of the sample until about the year 1970. Volatility
then traces out a hump-shaped pattern over the next 35 years (panel 1e). The volatility of
GDP price in￿ ation exhibits a similar hump-shaped pattern (panel 1f).
Measures of persistence and volatility are generally lower in the detrended data, but the
basic patterns resemble those in the raw data. Notice that these measures have declined
during the sample period since 1995. During the post-World War II sample period, the most
striking feature is the similarity in the patterns observed for the rolling persistence, rolling
volatility, and rolling mean of U.S. in￿ ation. This result con￿rms the ￿ndings of Cogley
and Sargent (2001, 2005) who use forward-looking Bayesian methods to identify a strong
positive correlation among summary statistics computed for post-World War II in￿ ation data.
Interestingly, one can identify some roughly similar patterns of comovement in the rolling
summary statistics for the earlier in￿ ation data plotted on the left-side of Figure 1.
Although not plotted, both U.S. in￿ ation series exhibit time-varying patterns of skewness
and kurtosis. Over the full sample, U.S. in￿ ation exhibits positive skewness and excess kurtosis,
5particularly in the detrended data. Overall, the time-varying and non-Gaussian features of
the data indicate the presence of nonlinearities in the law of motion for U.S. in￿ ation. In
later sections of the paper, a complete quantitative summary of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics will
be compared with the results of model simulations.
3 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The starting point for the analysis is the standard NKPC:






where ￿t is the in￿ ation rate de￿ned as the log di⁄erence of the price level, ￿ is the represen-
tative agent￿ s subjective time discount factor, yt is a stationary driving variable, and "t is an
iid markup shock that is often motivated by the presence of a variable tax rate.7 The symbol
b Et represents the agent￿ s subjective expectation conditioned on information available at time
t. Under rational expectations, b Et corresponds to the mathematical expectation operator Et
evaluated using the objective distributions of the driving variable and the markup shock.
The driving variable can be interpreted as either the output gap (often measured by de-
trended real GDP) or the representative ￿rm￿ s real marginal cost (often measured by labor￿ s
share of income). Since yt is taken here to be exogenous, none of the paper￿ s theoretical results
depend on which interpretation is chosen.8 The law of motion for the driving variable is






where ut is an iid demand shock that is uncorrelated with the markup shock. Monetary
policy enters implicitly in the model through two potential channels. The ￿rst is via the
trend (or steady-state) in￿ ation rate that is assumed when deriving equation (1) using a log-
linear approximation. The second is via the values of ￿ and ￿2
u; which can be interpreted
as reduced-form parameters that depend in a complicated way on the central bank￿ s policy
rule.9 Throughout the analysis, the trend in￿ ation rate is assumed to be zero and the policy-
dependent parameters ￿ and ￿2
u are held constant.
3.1 Rational Expectations
Under rational expectations, the in￿ ation rate at time t is uniquely pinned down by the agent￿ s
forecast of discounted future values of the driving variable, plus the current realization of the
markup shock. Two crucial assumptions are: (i) the agent knows the law of motion of the
driving variable, and (ii) the agent can observe the markup shock. To derive the unique
7A complete derivation of equation (1) from ￿rst principles can be found in Woodford (2003, Chapter 3).
8In empirical applications, the choice of driving variable is quite important. Detrended real GDP is pro-
cyclical whereas labor￿ s share of income is countercyclical. See Rudd and Whelan (2005c).
9A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose that the IS equation is given by yt = ￿yyt￿1 ￿
￿r
￿
ii ￿ c Et￿t+1 ￿ r
￿
+ &t; and the central bank￿ s policy rule is given by it = r + g￿ b Et￿t+1 + gyyt; where
it is the policy instrument, r is the steady-state real rate, and &t is an iid demand shock. Then, under rational
expectations
￿
b Et = Et
￿
, it can be shown that the equilibrum IS equation is exactly the form of (2), where ￿
and ￿
2
u both depend on g￿ and gy: If expectations are only boundedly-rational, then equation (2) is still likely
to be reasonable approximation of an empirically-plausible IS equation.
6rational expectations solution, we ￿rst replace b Et in equation (1) with the mathematical
expectation operator Et: Equation (1) can then be iterated forward to substitute out ￿t+1+k
for k = 0;1;2;::: Applying the law of iterated expectations and imposing a transversality















t represents the equilibrium in￿ ation rate under rational expectations. Given that ut







yt + "t; (4)
which shows that the rational (or fundamentals-based) in￿ ation rate inherits its stochastic
properties from both the autoregressive driving variable yt and the white-noise markup shock





conditional variance of "t is ￿2
": Fuhrer (2005) shows that empirically plausible values for the
Phillips curve slope parameter ￿ and the shock variance ratio ￿2
"=￿2
u imply that the behavior
of ￿re
t more-closely resembles white noise￿ a result that con￿ icts sharply with post-World War
II U.S. in￿ ation data.




























































where V ar(￿) and Cov (￿;￿) denote the unconditional variance and covariance, respectively,




Equation (6) con￿rms the results of Fuhrer (2005) that small values for the Phillips curve
slope parameter ￿ combined with nontrivial values for the shock variance ratio ￿2
"=￿2
u (the
empirically plausible case) imply very weak persistence of in￿ ation under rational expectations.
Equations (7) and (8) predict that the ￿rst di⁄erence of in￿ ation covaries positively with
the current value of the driving variable but covaries negatively with its lagged value. The
latter prediction is not consistent with U.S. data when the driving variable is measured by
7detrended real GDP. Finally, dividing equation (10) by equation (9) yields the prediction that
the autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes is negative￿ a robust feature of U.S. data.








which requires information about the current value of yt; the policy-dependent parameter
￿; and the Phillips curve slope parameter ￿: The discount factor ￿ is aspect of the agent￿ s
preferences and hence does not need to be observed.
3.2 Consistent Expectations
Equation (11) shows that rational forecasts derived from the standard NKPC are built on
strong assumptions about the representative agent￿ s information set. In actual forecasting
applications, real-time di¢ culties in observing the driving variable yt; together with empir-
ical instabilities in the parameters ￿ and ￿; could lead to large and persistent forecast er-
rors. Numerous studies have demonstrated that forecasts of U.S. in￿ ation computed from
backward-looking Phillips curve models can frequently underperform forecasts derived from
simple univariate time series models, such as a random walk, AR, or ARMA.10 One would
expect to encounter similar forecasting di¢ culties using the standard NKPC. These ideas
motivate consideration of alternative forecasting algorithm￿ one that requires less computa-
tional and informational resources. A long history in macroeconomics suggests the following
error-correction approach:
b Et￿t+1 = b Et￿1￿t + ￿
￿
￿t ￿ b Et￿1￿t
￿
; 0 < ￿ ￿ 1;
= ￿
h
￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿t￿2 + :::
i
; (12)
where ￿t ￿ b Et￿1￿t is the forecast error in period t: Equation (12) is immediately recognizable
as adaptive expectations. I assume here that the adaptive forecast makes use of the contem-
poraneous realization ￿t: This setup avoids the introduction of an extra lag of in￿ ation that
might be viewed as arti￿cially in￿ uencing the resulting dynamics.11 Equation (12) implies that
the agent￿ s subjective forecast at time t is determined by an exponentially-weighted moving
average of past observed in￿ ation rates. By comparison, the ￿sticky-information￿model of
Mankiw and Reis (2002) implies that the agent￿ s subjective forecast at time t is based on an
exponentially-weighted moving average of past rational forecasts.12 Both arrangements bear
symmetry to the Calvo (1983) sticky-price model where the equilibrium price level at time t
is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past observed prices.
10See, for example, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Stock and Watson (2005), Orphanides and Van Norden
(2005), and Ang. et al. (2005).
11A lagged information assumption is often used in learning models to avoid simultaneity in the determination
of the actual and expected values of the forecast variable. In the continuous time limit, the distinction between
contemporaneous and lagged information disappears.
12As shown by Carroll (2003), a simpli￿ed version of the Mankiw-Reis setup can be written as b Et￿t+1 =
b Et￿1￿t + ￿
￿
Et￿t+1 ￿ b Et￿1￿t
￿
; where ￿ is an exogenously-determined parameter that represents the fraction
of agents who update to the rational forecast Et￿t+1 each period.
8As originally shown by Muth (1960), adaptive expectations will coincide with rational
expectations when the forecast variable follows a simple and intuitive law of motion. That


































Cov (vt;￿t) = 0;
(13)
where ￿t is the central bank￿ s unobservable in￿ ation target which determines the in￿ ation
trend, vt is a transitory shock that pushes ￿t away from the target, and ￿t is permanent shock
(presumed to be uncorrelated with vt) that shifts the in￿ ation target over time. The agent￿ s
subjective forecast b Et￿t+1 is set equal to the Kalman ￿lter estimate of ￿t: The random walk
plus noise speci￿cation in (13) is equivalent to an ARMA (1,1), as shown by Harvey (1993,
p. 125). From the agent￿ s perspective, this would appear to be a reasonable candidate law
of motion because: (i) it allows for permanent shifts in the in￿ ation target, and (ii) it can
account for historical episodes where in￿ ation has evolved along a seemingly non-stationary
trajectory.
As evidence of the reasonableness of the agent￿ s perceived law of motion, it is worth
considering some recent examples from the literature. In the model of Erceg and Levin (2003),
the Fed￿ s in￿ ation target follows an AR(1) process with a coe¢ cient of 0.999. Kozicki and
Tinsely (2005) model the Fed￿ s in￿ ation target as a random walk process augmented with a
dummy variable that allows for a discrete downward shift in 1979.Q4. Ireland (2006) adopts
a geometric random walk speci￿cation for the Fed￿ s in￿ ation target. His estimated in￿ ation
target series for the period 1959.Q1 to 2004.Q2 closely resembles the low-frequency component
of U.S. in￿ ation plotted in Figure 1. Lastly, in the empirical model of Piger and Rasche (2006),
the estimated law of motion for in￿ ation includes a random walk component that is interpreted
as a measure of long-horizon in￿ ation expectations.
The agent￿ s perceived optimal choice of ￿ in equation (12) is determined by the Kalman
￿lter as the solution to a signal extraction problem where the objective is to minimize the mean







where ￿ = ￿2
￿ =￿2
v is the signal-to-noise ratio.13 As ￿ ! 1; the gain parameter approaches 1.
From the agent￿ s perspective, the shocks vt and ￿t are unobservable, but the value of ￿ can
be inferred from the moments of in￿ ation changes ￿￿t; which are observable.
Proposition 1. If the representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion is given by equation
(13), then the perceived optimal value of the gain parameter ￿ is uniquely pinned down by the
autocorrelation of observed in￿ation changes, Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1):
Proof : From (13), we have ￿￿t = ￿t+vt￿vt￿1: Since ￿t and vt are perceived to be independent,
we have Cov (￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = ￿￿2
v and V ar(￿￿t) = ￿2
￿+2￿2
v: Combining these two expressions





13For details, see Harvey (1993), pp. 126-127.
9where ￿ = ￿2
￿ =￿2
v and Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = Cov (￿￿t;￿￿t￿1)=V ar(￿￿t): The above expres-
sion shows that Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) uniquely pins down ￿ which, in turn, uniquely pins down
￿ from equation (14). ￿
Substituting the agent￿ s perceived optimal forecast (12) into the NKPC equation (1) yields























































where ￿ appears in numerous coe¢ cients. The variance-covariance matrix V of the left-side
variables in equation (15) can be computed using the formula:






where ￿ is the variance-covariance matrix of the fundamental shocks "t and ut. Since the
matrix A contains only ￿ve non-zero elements, straightforward (but tedious) computations

































































































which are all nonlinear in the gain parameter ￿. From equation (19), we see that in￿ ation
persistence is always positive, but the precise magnitude depends on the value of ￿ and several
other parameters. For values of ￿ and ￿ near one (the empirically plausible case), equations
(20) and (21) show that the ￿rst di⁄erence of in￿ ation covaries positively with both the current
value and lagged value of the driving variable. This feature is consistent with U.S. data
when the driving variable is measured by detrended real GDP. Recall that under rational-
expectations, the NKPC predicts a positive covariance with the current value of the driving
variable, but a negative covariance with the lagged value.
103.2.1 De￿ning the Consistent Expectations Equilibrium
This section de￿nes the concept of a ￿consistent expectations equilibrium￿along the lines of
Hommes and Sorger (1998). By applying the results of Proposition 1, the value of the gain
parameter ￿ that appears in the adaptive forecast rule (12) can be uniquely pinned down using
the correlation structure of the observed time series. Since the agent￿ s perceived law of motion
(13) implies that ￿t is nonstationary, it is natural to assume that the agent￿ s forecast rule is
parameterized to match the autocorrelation of ￿￿t:14 The following expression for ￿￿t can























































where the constants ai and bi are used here to represent combinations of parameters. Equation















































































is given by equation (17) and the covariance between the agent￿ s subjec-












Dividing equation (24) by equation (23) yields an expression for Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) which
is nonlinear in the gain parameter ￿: This nonlinear expression is employed in the following
de￿nition of equilibrium.
14In Hommes and Sorger (1998), the agent￿ s forecast rule is parameterized for a perceived law of motion that
is linear, when in fact the actual law of motion is nonlinear. Here, the agent￿ s forecast rule is parameterized for
a perceived law of motion that is nonstationary, when in fact the actual law of motion is stationary (but highly
persistent).
11De￿nition 1. A consistent expectations equilibrium is de￿ned as a perceived law of motion
(13), an actual law of motion (15), and an associated gain parameter ￿; such that ￿ is the















with V ar(￿￿t) and Cov (￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) computed from the actual law of motion, as given by
equations (23) and (24).
4 Numerical Solution for the Equilibrium
The complexity of the nonlinear map ￿ = f (￿) necessitates a numerical solution for the
equilibrium. To accomplish this, the model is calibrated using a set of parameter values that
are either estimated directly, or based on empirical estimates reported in the literature. The
driving variable for in￿ ation is assumed to be the output gap, i.e., the deviation of log real
GDP from log potential output.15 Based on the results of 20-year rolling AR(1) regressions
for the output gap over the period 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4, I choose ￿ = 0:90 and ￿u = 0:01:
Estimates of the NKPC parameters ￿; ￿; and ￿" are sensitive to the choice of the driving
variable, the speci￿cation for in￿ ation expectations, the sample period, and the econometric
method.16 Based on the various studies, I choose ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:03; and ￿" = 0:01 as baseline
values. I also examine the sensitivity of the results to some alternative parameter values.
Figure 2 plots f (￿) over the admissible range 0 < ￿ ￿ 1: For the baseline calibration with
slope parameter ￿ = 0:03, the unique ￿xed point occurs at ￿￿ = 0:346 (panel 2a). When the
slope parameter is increased to ￿ = 0:08; the unique ￿xed point shifts upward to ￿￿ = 0:695
(panel 2b). A higher value of ￿￿ means that the representative agent is assigning more weight
to recent in￿ ation data because the perceived signal-to-noise ratio has increased. Experiments
with the model show that ￿￿ increases with the values of ￿; ￿; ￿2
u; and ￿; but decreases
with the value of ￿2
": These results are completely intuitive. Roughly speaking, parameter
changes that increase the persistence of in￿ ation via the driving variable (￿; ￿; and ￿2
u) or
via the expectations term (￿) have the e⁄ect of increasing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio.
Parameter changes that decrease the persistence of in￿ ation via the markup shock channel
(￿2
") have the e⁄ect of decreasing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. Finally, notice that the
plot of f (￿) lies very close to the 45-degree line for a wide range of candidate ￿ values. This
result suggests that forecast accuracy is not likely to su⁄er much as long as ￿ remains in the
general vicinity of ￿￿: This conjecture turns out to be true, as discussed later in section 5.
15Data on real GDP is from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC96. The potential out-
put series is constructed by the U.S. Congressional Budget O¢ ce. The data is available from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT.mm
16See, for example, Roberts (2005), Rudd and Whelan (2005a, 2005b), Gal￿ et al. (2005), Neiss and Nelson
(2005), Fuhrer (2005), and Adam and Padula (2003).
12Figure 2: Determination of ￿￿ for consistent expectations equilibrium.
Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis
Phillips Curve Slope Parameter
Variance
Ratio Result









































































Notes: Changes in ￿2
"=￿2




2 : Other parameters are held
constant at the values: ￿ = 0:98; and ￿ = 0:90:
13Figure 3: In￿ ation persistence and volatility under di⁄erent forms of expectations.
Table 1 provides a sensitivity analysis to show how the equilibrium values of ￿￿ and ￿￿
change with the slope parameter ￿ and the fundamental shock variance ratio ￿2
"=￿2
u The table
also compares in￿ ation persistence (as measured by the ￿rst-order autocorrelation) under the
two forms of expectations: consistent versus rational. The table shows that ￿￿ and ￿￿ are
highest for parameter con￿gurations at the bottom right, those with high ￿ and low ￿2
"=￿2
u:
In￿ ation persistence is also highest for these con￿gurations. At the baseline calibration with
￿ = 0:03 and ￿2
"=￿2







Figure 3 shows how in￿ ation persistence and volatility are in￿ uenced by the gain parameter.
All parameters are set to their baseline values. The term ￿adaptive expectations￿ is used
here to describe the general case where the value of ￿ is not pinned down by any perceived
optimal algorithm. The term ￿consistent expectations￿is reserved for the special case when
￿ = ￿￿: Panel 3a shows that in￿ ation persistence is generally high under adaptive expectations,
but drops o⁄ dramatically for ￿ > 0:9 or ￿ < 0:1. Panel 3b shows that in￿ ation volatility
increases with ￿ in a nonlinear fashion and always exceeds the corresponding value under
rational expectations. The fact that in￿ ation persistence and volatility can vary, depending
on the value of ￿; is an important feature of the model that will be examined further in the
quantitative simulations presented in section 6.
14Figure 4: Identifying the signal-to-noise ratio and the optimal gain parameter from U.S. data.
5 Applying the Model￿ s Methodology to U.S. In￿ ation Data
Figure 4 provides a check on the reasonableness of the equilibrium values of ￿￿ and ￿￿ implied
by the model. Panel 4a plots the 20-year rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the change in
U.S. GDP price in￿ ation. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient is negative throughout the sample.
Panel 4b plots the perceived signal-to-noise ratio computed directly from the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient using the formula in Proposition 1. The perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿ uctuates
from a low of 0.1 to a high of 5.7. The upward spike that occurs in the early-1990s is due to
the autocorrelation coe¢ cient becoming less negative at that time. The perceived ratio drifts
upward in the 1970s, remains high for about two decades, and then drifts downward from the
mid-1990s onwards. Stock and Watson (2005) obtain a similar humped-shaped pattern for
the signal-to-noise ratio when estimating an unobserved-components model identical to (13)
using quarterly data on U.S. GDP price in￿ ation from 1953.Q1 to 2004.Q4. They identify
statistically signi￿cant movements in the variance of the permanent shock, but cannot reject
the hypothesis of no change in the variance of the transitory shock. Piger and Rasche (2006)
report a decline in the estimated variance of permanent shocks to U.S. in￿ ation in the sample
period after 1994.Q1. They interpret their results as ￿evidence that long-horizon in￿ ation ex-
pectations have become better anchored during the period of increasing FOMC transparency.￿
The foregoing results suggest that the inverse of the signal-to-noise ratio identi￿ed from U.S.
in￿ ation data might be used as a quantitative measure of the Fed￿ s credibility for maintaining
a constant in￿ ation target.
15Figure 5: Comparing expected and realized U.S. in￿ ation to model-based values.
Panel 4c plots the perceived U.S. optimal gain parameter computed directly from the
perceived U.S. signal-to-noise ratio using equation (14).17 The gain parameter ￿ uctuates from
a low of 0.28 to a high of 0.87, with the high also occurring in the early 1990s. The variation
in the perceived optimal gain parameter inferred from U.S. data suggests a ￿variable-gain￿
version of the model where ￿￿ is computed using a rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient for ￿￿t.
A rolling sample period allows the gain parameter in the agent￿ s forecast rule (12) to adjust
to perceived shifts in the underlying signal-to-noise ratio.
Figure 5 compares measures of expected and realized U.S. in￿ ation to the corresponding
model-based values. Expected in￿ ation in U.S. data is measured by the 1-year ahead forecast
for GDP price in￿ ation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The sample period for the
survey starts in 1970.Q1.18 For the rational expectations (RE) version of the model, expected
in￿ ation is computed from equation (11), where ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:90; ￿ = 0:98; and yt is
the output gap from U.S. data.19 For the consistent expectations (CE) version of the model,
17Strictly speaking, equation (14) applies only to the steady-state. Out of steady-state, McCulloch (2005)
shows that the optimal gain parameter evolves according to ￿t = (￿t￿1 + ￿)=(1 + ￿t￿1 + ￿): Replotting panel
4c using this law of motion together with the current inferred value of ￿ from U.S. data produced nearly identical
results.
18The survey data is available from http://www.phil.frb.org/￿les/spf/cpie1.txt. It should be noted that
model-based values of expected in￿ ation are annualized 1-quarter rates, whereas the survey data are 1-year
ahead average in￿ ation rates.
19Recall that equation (11) implies a steady-state in￿ ation rate of zero. For comparison with the survey, the
RE model-based value is shifted up by a constant to match the mean of U.S. in￿ ation over the sample period.
16expected in￿ ation is computed from equation (12) with ￿ = ￿￿ = 0:346: The ￿gure also plots
expected in￿ ation for a variable-gain version of the CE model, where the gain sequence is taken
from the bottom panel of Figure 4.20 Given the model-based values for expected in￿ ation,
values for realized in￿ ation are computed from the NKPC equation (1) where yt is the U.S.
output gap and the markup shock "t is set equal to zero each period.
Panels 5a and 5b show that the RE model performs poorly in capturing observed move-
ments in U.S. data, whereas both versions of the CE model perform quite well. These plots
reinforce the point made earlier that Phillips-curve based in￿ ation forecasts may frequently
underperform simple univariate time series forecasts. A more detailed comparison between
U.S. data and simulated data from the model is provided in section 7.
6 In￿ ation Forecast Errors
This section characterizes the unconditional moments of in￿ ation forecast errors. It turns
out that when the actual law of motion for in￿ ation is given by (15), the errors associated
with the adaptive forecast (12) exhibit near-zero autocorrelation for most values of the gain
parameter ￿: Furthermore, an agent who is concerned about minimizing forecast errors can
become ￿locked-in￿to the use of the adaptive forecast. In particular, for most values of ￿; the
agent will perceive no accuracy gain from switching to a Phillips curve-based forecast.21
Suppose that the representative agent initially adopts the adaptive forecast given by equa-
tion (12). The initial choice could be justi￿ed for reasons of computational or informational
simplicity. The forecast error observed by the agent is given by
err
aja
t+1 = ￿t+1 ￿ b Et￿t+1;
=
￿







where I have made use of the actual law of motion (15). The superscript ￿aja￿denotes the
error associated with the adaptive forecast, conditional on in￿ ation being being generated
using the adaptive forecast.
Now consider an agent who is contemplating a switch to a Phillips curve-based forecast.
In deciding whether to switch forecasts, the agent keeps track of the forecast errors associated
with the alternative forecast method. Before any switch occurs, the actual law of motion for
￿t is still given by (15). For simplicity, assume that enough time has gone by to allow the
agent to have discovered the stochastic process for the driving variable, and also assume that
the agent is endowed with knowledge of the slope parameter ￿: With these assumptions, the



















where the superscript ￿pcja￿ denotes the error associated with the Phillips curve forecast,
conditional on in￿ ation being generated using the adaptive forecast.
20Both versions of the CE model employ the initial condition b Et￿1￿t = ￿t￿1; where t ￿ 1 corresponds to
1968.Q4.
21Lansing (2006) examines the concept of forecast lock-in using a standard Lucas-type asset pricing model.
17For comparison purposes, it is useful to compute the forecast errors that arise when in￿ ation
is governed by the rational law of motion (4). In this case, the error associated with the












where the superscript ￿ajpc￿denotes the error associated with the adaptive forecast, condi-
tional on in￿ ation being generated using the rational Phillips curve forecast. The adaptive
forecast now evolves according to recursion b Et￿re
t+1 = ￿￿re
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b Et￿1￿re
t ; where ￿re
t is
governed by the rational law of motion (4).








(1￿￿￿) ut+1 + "t+1; (29)
where the superscript ￿pcjpc￿denotes the error associated with the rational Phillips curve
forecast, conditional on in￿ ation being generated using the Phillips curve forecast.
6.1 Forecast Lock-in
Given a su¢ ciently long time series of observations, the agent could compute the moments of
the observed forecast errors under each of the above scenarios. Appendix A provides analytical






tion of the forecast errors Corr(errt+1;errt): If the representative agent initially chooses the
adaptive forecast, then the associated ￿tness measure is given by MSE aja. Conditional on the
same law of motion, the ￿tness measure for the Phillips curve forecast is given by MSE pcja:
These ￿tness measures are used in the following de￿nition of forecast lock-in.
De￿nition 2. Lock-in of the adaptive forecast (12) occurs when: (i) the actual law of motion
for ￿t is given by equation (15), (ii) the gain parameter is within the admissible range 0 <




Figure 6 plots the moments of the in￿ ation forecast errors for 0 < ￿ ￿ 1: All parameters
are set to the baseline values. For ease of comparison across panels, I plot the root mean
squared error RMSE. Lower values imply a more accurate forecast. Vertical lines mark the
value ￿￿ that is consistent with the perceived law of motion (13). When in￿ ation is generated
using the adaptive forecast (panels 6a and 6c), we have ￿￿ = 0:346; as demonstrated earlier
in section 4. In contrast, when in￿ ation is generated using the rational Phillips curve forecast
(panels 6b and 6d), we have ￿￿ = 0:218:22 The lower value of ￿￿ obtains in this case because
in￿ ation is less persistent when it evolves according to the rational law of motion (4).
Panel 6a shows that the conditions needed for lock-in of the adaptive forecast are satis￿ed
for 0 < ￿ < 0:98: In this range, the combination of in￿ ation persistence and volatility induced
by the actual law of motion (15) cause the adaptive forecast to be more accurate than the





t￿1) ￿ 2: Dividing equation (10) by equation (9)




t￿1) = ￿0:485, such that ￿
￿ = 0:061: Plugging this value into equation
(14) yields ￿
￿ = 0:218:
18Figure 6: Root mean squared forecast error and autocorrelation of forecast errors.
Phillips curve forecast. As ￿ ! 1, persistence declines and volatility rises, as shown in Figure
3. Lower persistence combined with higher volatility has the e⁄ect of reducing the accuracy of
the adaptive forecast relative to the Phillips curve forecast. For 0:98 ￿ ￿ < 1, the conditions
needed for lock-in are no longer satis￿ed.
Notice that the plot of RMSE for the adaptive forecast is relatively ￿ at in the vicinity
of ￿￿: This validates the conjecture put forth earlier in the discussion of Figure 2; forecast
accuracy does not su⁄er much as long as ￿ remains in the general vicinity of ￿￿. The intuition
for why lock-in occurs is straightforward. In computing the forecast ￿tness measures, the
representative agent views the evolution of ￿t as being determined outside of his control. In
equilibrium, of course, the chosen forecast method does in fact in￿ uence the evolution of ￿t:
When the agent initially chooses the adaptive forecast, the resulting law of motion for ￿t
is such that the Phillips curve forecast is no longer the most accurate. Similar to the lock-
in phenomena described by David (1985) and Arthur (1989), externalities that arise from
an initial choice can lead to irreversibilities that may cause agents to stick with an inferior
technology. Here, the adaptive forecast can be viewed as an inferior prediction technology
because the mean squared forecast error could be lowered if the representative agent could be
induced to switch to the Phillips curve forecast.
Panel 6b shows the unsurprising result that the rational Phillips curve forecast is always
more accurate than the adaptive forecast when in￿ ation is actually generated using the Phillips
curve forecast. Comparing across panels, the rational Phillips curve forecast in panel 6b yields
RMSE = 0:0103; whereas the adaptive forecast in panel 6a yields RMSE = 0:0152 when
19￿ = ￿￿: Thus, the typical forecast error observed under consistent expectations is only about
50 basis points higher than that observed under rational expectations. This di⁄erence would be
even smaller if we took into account real-time measurement errors in yt; or empirical instability
in the parameters ￿ and ￿; the latter being a policy-dependent parameter that is subject to
the Lucas critique. Table 2 provides a quantitative comparison of the forecast ￿tness measures
under each of the forecast scenarios.
Table 2: Forecast Fitness Measures (RMSE)
￿t forecasted by:
￿t generated by: Adaptive Forecast (￿ = ￿￿) Phillips Curve Forecast
Adaptive Forecast (￿ = ￿￿) 0:015 0:040
Phillips Curve Forecast 0:506 0:010
Parameter values: ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01
Panel 6c shows that for most values of ￿; the autocorrelation of adaptive forecast errors
is close to zero, making it di¢ cult for the agent to detect a misspeci￿cation of the forecast
rule. The autocorrelation starts out narrowly positive for ￿ near zero, remains nearly constant









= ￿0:0014: At the same value of ￿, the Phillips curve forecast is









In panel 6d, the autocorrelation of forecast errors is identically zero for the rational Phillips
curve forecast. The errors observed for the adaptive forecast once again exhibit near-zero
autocorrelation for most values of ￿: This result is an inherent feature of the error-correction
approach to forecasting, as embodied in the forecast rule (12).
7 Model Simulations
Figure 7 plots simulated data for three di⁄erent forms of in￿ ation expectations. The left-side
panels show the results for rational expectations (RE). The middle panels show the results
for consistent expectations (CE), where the gain parameter is held constant at the theoretical
equilibrium value ￿￿ = 0:346 implied by De￿nition 1. The right-side panels show the results for
an alternative ￿variable-gain￿version of the CE model. Under this setup, the gain parameter
evolves according to the out-of-steady-state version of equation (14) given by
￿t =
￿t￿1 + ￿
1 + ￿t￿1 + ￿
; (30)
where ￿ is inferred from the autocorrelation of ￿￿t over a 20-year (80-quarter) rolling sample
period.23 Recall that the autocorrelation of ￿￿t uniquely identi￿es the perceived signal-to-
noise ratio ￿, as shown by Proposition 1. The use of a 20-year rolling sample period allows for
slowly-evolving perceptions of ￿, where perceptions are based on each generation￿ s in￿ ation
experience. Alternatively, we may think of the representative agent as an econometrician who
views 20-year-old in￿ ation data as being uninformative about the current value of ￿. Along
23Use of the steady-state relationship (14) in place of equation (30) yields very similar results. For the initial
20 years of the simulation, I impose ￿t = ￿
￿ = 0:346: Summary statistics are then computed after dropping the
￿rst 200 quarters of simulated data.
20Figure 7: Simulated in￿ ation dynamics for three di⁄erent forms of expectations.
these lines, Stock and Watson (1996) ￿nd strong evidence of structural instability in various
U.S. in￿ ation series. They also ￿nd that 10- and 20-year rolling regression models tend to
perform better than ￿xed coe¢ cient models in out-of-sample forecasts. Friedman (1979, p.
33) points out that much of the empirical time series analysis in economics is based on ￿some
rough form of rolling sample period.￿The basic nature of the simulation results is robust to
changes to the length of the rolling sample period. The fact that f (￿) lies very close to the 45-
degree line in Figure 2 implies that a small amount of sampling variation in the autocorrelation
of ￿￿t can translate into large shifts in the perceived optimal gain parameter.
In the variable-gain CE model, the actual law of motion for in￿ ation is nonlinear and
thus capable of generating time-varying persistence and volatility.24 At times during variable-
gain simulation, the rolling autocorrelation of ￿￿t may yield the result that ￿ < 0; which is
infeasible for a ratio of two variances. When this occurs, ￿ is set equal to a very small positive
number, i.e., 1 ￿ 10￿10: The discussion below focuses mainly on measures of persistence and
24Laxton, Rose, and Tambakis (1999) review the empirical evidence for nonlinearities in the U.S. Phillips
curve relationship that may exist for structural reasons separate from the expectations channel explored here.
21volatility computed from the detrended in￿ ation data, since these are not unduly in￿ uenced
by low-frequency swings in the level of in￿ ation.
Comparing across panels 7a, 7b, and 7c, we see that the same sequence of random shocks
can lead to vastly di⁄erent in￿ ation dynamics, depending on the form of in￿ ation expectations.
The RE model￿ s detrended in￿ ation data exhibits very mild variation in persistence (panel
7d) and essentially no variation in volatility (panel 7j). Detrended data from the constant-
gain CE model exhibits a fair amount of variation in persistence (panel 7e), but very little
variation in volatility (panel 7h). Detrended data from the variable-gain CE model exhibits
large variations in both persistence (panel 7f) and volatility (panel 7i).
In stark contrast to the RE model, both versions of the CE model produce low-frequency
swings in the level of in￿ ation, as measured by either the band pass ￿lter trends (panels 7b
and 7c) or the 20-year rolling sample means (panels 7k and 71). The low-frequency swings
are not caused by changes in monetary policy. Instead, these movements derive solely from
the near-random walk behavior of ￿t under consistent expectations. The CE-version of the
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which implies that the sum of the weights on lagged in￿ ation is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿￿) =
0:970 when ￿ = 0:98 and ￿￿ = 0:346: Given the highly persistent nature of ￿t observed
in equilibrium, it would be very di¢ cult for the agent to the reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root in in￿ ation, thus lending support for the perceived law of motion (13).
An enormous literature has explored explanations for the ￿Great In￿ ation￿of the 1970s
and the subsequent ￿Volcker disin￿ ation￿ of the early 1980s. Theories about the rise and
fall of U.S. in￿ ation fall roughly into one of three categories: bad luck theories (which em-
phasize chance events outside the Fed￿ s control), policy mistake theories (which emphasize
discretionary actions by Fed policymakers), and combination theories (where chance and dis-
cretion both play a role). The ultimate bad-luck theory is that U.S. in￿ ation is governed by
a random-walk process or something close to one. This means that a sequence of white-noise
shocks can generate large excursions in the in￿ ation rate without any fundamental change in
the underlying economy. Agents living in such an economy observe one history. They may
wish to know why a speci￿c pattern emerges in the data but there is no explanation to be
found. According to this theory, there is nothing special about the 1970s and 1980s and similar
events can happen again, given enough time. King and Watson (1994) present evidence that
post-war U.S. in￿ ation is indeed governed by a random-walk process.
The variable-gain CE model produces some episodes where the 20-year rolling measures
of persistence, volatility, and the level of in￿ ation all trace out hump-shaped patterns. These
patterns are similar to those in post-World II U.S. data. The simulation results suggest that
white-noise fundamental shocks, propagated via the expectations feedback mechanism, could
have played an important role in producing the historical pattern of U.S. in￿ ation. Indeed,
Blinder (1982) argues that oil and food price shocks, coupled with pent-up in￿ ation from the
release of the Nixon wage-price controls in 1974, can account for most of the rise in in￿ ation
during the 1970s. He also argues that the absence of these same factors can account for most
of the fall in in￿ ation during the early 1980s. More recently, Sims and Zha (2006) argue
that the primary source of the rise and fall of U.S. in￿ ation was a ￿changing array of major
disturbances￿that occurred during a relatively stable monetary policy regime.
22Figure 8: Additional plots for the variable-gain simulation.
At the peak of the Great In￿ ation in 1979, Fed Chairman Volcker acknowledged the im-
portance of in￿ ation expectations as a driving force for realized in￿ ation. He said: ￿In￿ ation
feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive
economy must be to break the grip of in￿ ationary expectations.￿ 25 Theories about the Volcker
disin￿ ation typically emphasize the role of the Fed credibility, noting that the rate at which
credibility accumulates depends on the nature of in￿ ation expectations.26 This idea connects
back to the CE model interpretation of the perceived signal-to-noise ratio as an inverse mea-
sure of central bank credibility. In the next section of the paper, I discuss some possibilities
for extending the present analysis to incorporate explicit changes in monetary policy.
Figure 8 provides additional justi￿cation for the variable-gain setup. Panel 8a plots the
signal-to-noise ratios inferred from the rolling autocorrelation of ￿￿t for both the constant-
gain and variable-gain simulations. The inferred value of ￿ from the constant-gain simulation
exhibits a fair amount of variation. From the agent￿ s perspective, the presence of this stochastic
volatility would appear to justify a switch to a variable-gain forecasting algorithm. Once the
switch occurs, the volatility of the inferred value of ￿ would become magni￿ed.
Panel 8b plots the time-path of the variable gain parameter. The average value of the
gain parameter over the simulation is 0.393, with a standard deviation of 0.275. The gain
rises sharply in response to upward spikes in the inferred signal-to-noise ratio. These episodes
25See Volcker (1979), pp. 888-889.
26For references to the literature, see Huh and Lansing (2000) and Erceg and Levin (2003).
23might interpreted as a recurring ￿credibility crises￿ or ￿in￿ ation scares￿ which cause the
representative agent to heavily discount the central bank￿ s past track record on in￿ ation.27
De￿ ation scares are also possible. Lastly, panel 7c shows that when in￿ ation is actually
generated using the variable-gain forecast, the agent perceives no accuracy gain from switching
to the Phillips curve forecast. For this experiment, the RMSE for each forecast is computed
over a 20-year rolling sample period.
Table 3 provides a quantitative comparison of the forecast errors across the three forms of
in￿ ation expectations. The RE model delivers the most-accurate forecasts (as indicated by the
lowest RMSE value), whereas the variable-gain CE model delivers the least-accurate forecasts.
However, as shown earlier in section 6 and in the bottom panel of ￿gure 8, if the representative
agent initially chooses an adaptive forecast rule, then the agent is unlikely to perceive any
accuracy gain from switching to the (rational) Phillips curve forecast. Under either version of
the CE model, the forecast errors are close to white noise. If we assume that the distribution of
the model autocorrelation statistic is approximately Gaussian, then the conventional standard






￿ ￿2:0: Solving this
formula yields the result that a sample size of at least T ￿ 400 quarters, or 100 years, would
be needed to reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the forecast error. In practice,
a even larger sample size would be needed to account for the sampling error of the model
autocorrelation statistic.









RMSE 0:010 0:015 0:027
Corr(errt;errt￿1) 0:00 0:01 ￿0:10
Corr(errt;errt￿2) ￿0:01 ￿0:01 ￿0:01
Corr(errt;errt￿3) 0:00 0:00 0:00
Notes: Statistics above refer to raw data from a 2000-quarter simulation
after dropping 200 quarters. The variable-gain CE model uses a 20-year
(80-quarter) rolling sample period for computing the perceived signal-to-noise
ratio ￿: Parameter values: ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
Table 4 compares the moments of U.S. data with the corresponding moments computed
from model simulations. Statistics are presented for both raw and detrended data. I focus on
the behavior of detrended in￿ ation since this controls for the presence of low-frequency swings
in the raw data. The standard deviation of detrended in￿ ation from the variable-gain CE
model is 0.027￿ the largest among the three models. The corresponding ￿gure for long-run
U.S. CPI in￿ ation is 0.073, whereas the ￿gure for U.S. GDP price in￿ ation in the post-World
War II sample period is 0.016. Detrended in￿ ation data from the variable-gain CE model
exhibits positive skewness and excess kurtosis. These features are also present in detrended
27Goodfriend (1993) de￿nes an in￿ ation scare as a signi￿cant increase in the long-term nominal interest
rate that is driven solely by an upward jump in private-sector expectations about future in￿ ation￿ absent any
central bank action to push up short-term interest rates.
24U.S. in￿ ation data. The persistence of detrended in￿ ation is highest with the variable-gain
CE model, providing the best match with U.S. data. Appendix B reports the amplitude of
the variation in the 20-year rolling summary statistics. Again, the variable-gain CE model
seems to provide the best match with the U.S. data, con￿rming the informal visual comparison
between Figure 1 and Figure 7.
Table 4: Unconditional Moments, Raw and Detrended Data
















































































Corr(￿￿t;yt) ￿ 0:09 0:05 0:03 0:03
Corr(￿￿t;yt￿1) ￿ 0:03 ￿0:04 0:01 0:02
Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) ￿0:27 ￿0:34 ￿0:48 ￿0:45 ￿0:33
Notes: Statistics for ￿t are based on raw data (top number) and detrended data (bottom number).
The detrended data are obtained using the band pass ￿lter of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).
Statistics for ￿￿t and yt are based on raw data. Model statistics are computed from a 2000 quarter
simulation after dropping 200 quarters. The variable gain CE model uses a 20-year (80-quarter)
rolling sample period for computing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿: Parameter values: ￿ = :98;
￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
8 Extensions of the Model
8.1 Higher-Order Consistency of the Variable-Gain Setup
In the variable-gain CE model, the agent perceives the signal-to-noise ratio ￿ to be time-
varying. This perception turns out to be justi￿ed by the variation in ￿ that is inferred from
a 20-year rolling autocorrelation of ￿￿t. A more sophisticated agent might adopt a perceived
law of motion for the signal-to-noise ratio and then apply the Kalman ￿lter to extract an

























25where Cov (￿t;!t) = 0; and the geometric random walk speci￿cation ensures ￿t > 0.28 In this
case, the optimal estimate of log(￿t) is determined by an exponentially-weighted moving aver-
age of past estimates, where the perceived optimal gain parameter that governs the weighting
scheme depends on the higher-order signal-to-noise ratio ￿2
! =￿2
￿: Following the methodology
outlined in Proposition 1, the agent could identify the value of the higher-order signal-to-noise
ratio from the autocorrelation of ￿log(￿t) and proceed accordingly.
The above discussion shows that imposing higher-order consistency on the variable-gain
CE model is no doubt feasible. Such an arrangement brings with it the assumption of greater
computational sophistication on the part of the representative agent. Such assumptions, when
extrapolated to their ultimate conclusion, lead back towards the rational expectations equilib-
rium. Another possible approach would be to adopt one of the many variable-gain forecasting
algorithms that have been developed in the vast literature on exponential smoothing. These
algorithms adjust the gain parameter up or down over time in a controlled manner to account
for changes in the underlying covariance structure of the forecast variable.29 The approach
taken in this paper is to assume that the agent adjusts for perceived shifts in the signal-to-noise
ratio by discarding old data￿ much like an econometrician would do.
8.2 Shifts in Policy-Dependent Parameters
The present analysis holds all policy-dependent parameters constant. An extension of the
model could allow for shifts in the coe¢ cients of the central bank￿ s policy rule that would
in￿ uence the reduced-form stochastic properties of the driving variable yt via equation (2). A
simple example is provided in footnote 9. A more comprehensive treatment of monetary policy
would embed the consistent expectations equilibrium concept into a fully-articulated New
Keynesian model that includes a micro-founded IS equation. The introduction of consistent
expectations in place of rational expectations in such a model is motivated by the ability of the
former to match important features of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics. Under consistent expectations,
the persistence of in￿ ation is governed by the equilibrium value of the gain parameter which,
in turn, is linked to the autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1). Since this
autocorrelation is in￿ uenced by monetary policy, the central bank￿ s optimal policy rule would
need to take into account the manner in which private-sector expectations are formed.30
The model could also be extended to allow for actual shifts in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation
target. As mentioned in the introduction, such an extension would require the use of a modi￿ed
(and more complicated) NKPC that is log-linearized around a non-zero trend in￿ ation rate.
Recall that the representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion (13) already allows for evolving
shifts in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target. Introducing actual shifts in the in￿ ation target
according to some law of motion would bring the agent￿ s perception closer to reality.
28In estimating an unobserved components model on U.S. in￿ ation data, Stock and Watson (2005) assume
that the variances of the permanent and transitory shocks follow independent geometric random walks. In
contrast, equations (32) and (33) assume that the ratio of these two variances follows a geometric random walk
with noise.
29For a review of variable-gain smoothing algorithms, see Gardner (1985, p. 19).
30Recent research on expectations and optimal monetary policy includes: Rudebusch (2002), Amato and
Laubach (2003), Steinsson (2003), Lansing and Trehan (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2005), Ball, Mankiw,
and Reis (2005), Levin and Moessner (2005), Woodford (2005), and Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006), among
others.
269 Concluding Remarks
Evolving theories about in￿ ation expectations, led by the contributions of Phelps (1967),
Friedman (1968), Sargent (1971), and Lucas (1972, 1973) have played a important role in
developing the modern view of the Phillips curve. The current workhorse version for macro-
economics is the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve with rational expectations.
The advantages of the NKPC are its tractability and its link to microfoundations that assume
optimizing behavior on the part of agents and ￿rms. The biggest disadvantage of the NKPC
is its inability to account for important features of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics.
This paper showed that a plausible and justi￿able departure from 100-percent rationality￿
in the form of consistent expectations￿ allows the NKPC to reproduce many of the features
observed in long-run U.S. in￿ ation data, including: time-varying persistence and volatility,
positive skewness, excess kurtosis, and pronounced low-frequency swings. Under consistent
expectations, the agent￿ s forecast rule is optimized for a set of beliefs and observations about
in￿ ation. The forecast errors observed by the agent are close to white noise, making it dif-
￿cult to detect a misspeci￿cation of the forecast rule. Moreover, from the individual agent￿ s
perspective, switching to a (rational) NKPC-based forecast would appear to reduce forecast
accuracy, so there is no incentive to switch.
In the variable-gain version of consistent expectations, endogenous shifts in the agent￿ s
perceived signal-to-noise ratio (which might be viewed as an inverse-measure of central bank
credibility) give rise to changes in in￿ ation persistence and volatility. These changes take place
in the absence of any underlying shifts in monetary policy. This feature of the model o⁄ers a
possible explanation for the end-of-sample decline in U.S. in￿ ation persistence shown in Figure
1, which has occurred during a period of seemingly-unchanged monetary policy.
Rational expectations are sometimes called ￿model consistent expectations.￿A more pre-
cise term would be ￿actual-model consistent expectations,￿because the maintained assumption
is that the agent knows the actual model. In contrast, the equilibrium concept employed in this
paper could be described as ￿perceived-model consistent expectations,￿because the agent￿ s
forecast rule is optimal, conditional on a perceived law of motion for in￿ ation and observed
moments of the in￿ ation time series.
In the modi￿ed NKPC developed here, expected in￿ ation is an exponentially-weighted
moving average of past observed in￿ ation rates. The consistent expectations equilibrium con-
cept uniquely pins down the value of the gain parameter that governs the weights assigned to
past rates of in￿ ation. This result harkens back to the ￿accelerationist controversy￿identi￿ed
by Sargent (1971, p. 35) who argued persuasively that any weighting scheme involving past
rates of in￿ ation should ￿be compatible with the observed evolution of the rate of in￿ ation.￿
Sargent￿ s criterion is precisely the logic that underlies the choice of the gain parameter in the
consistent expectations equilibrium.
27A Appendix: Moments of In￿ ation Forecast Errors
This appendix provides analytical expressions for the moments used in plotting Figure 6.
A.1 In￿ ation Generated Using Adaptive Forecast
First consider the case when the representative agent employs the adaptive forecast (12). In
equilibrium, the actual of motion is given by equation (15). Both the adaptive forecast and the












= 0; where E (￿) denotes
the unconditional mean.
































0; the adaptive forecast tracks movements in the driving variable, similar to the case of rational
expectations (11). Movements in the driving variable are persistent, so the tracking feature
improves the accuracy of the forecast.











































: However, the following simpli￿ed version can be obtained
















which bears a striking resemblance to the autocorrelation of in￿ ation under rational expecta-
tions, as given by (6) A comparison of (6) and (A.3) reveals that parameter con￿gurations
which give rise to low autocorrelation of in￿ ation under rational expectations will imply an
even lower autocorrelation of forecast errors under adaptive expectations.

































continue to be given by (17) and (25).






















































A.2 In￿ ation Generated Using Phillips Curve Forecast
Now consider the case when the representative agent employs the (rational) Phillips curve
forecast (11). In equilibrium, in￿ ation is governed by the rational law of motion (4). Both














































can be computed from the recursion b Et￿re
t+1 =
￿￿re
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b Et￿1￿re



































> 0; the adaptive forecast tracks movements in the driving
variable.


















￿ ￿[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿2
























continue to be given by (A.7) and (A.8). Dividing
















For the last of the four cases, we start from (29). The ￿tness measure for the rational
















which is the standard result that forecast errors are serially uncorrelated under rational ex-
pectations.
29B Appendix: Amplitude of Variation in 20-Year Rolling Sum-
mary Statistics
Table B.1: 20-Year Rolling Summary Statistics, Raw and Detrended Data

































































































































Notes: For each statistic, the top number refers to raw data while the bottom number refers to
detrended data. The detrended data are obtained using the band pass ￿lter of Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003). Model statistics are computed from a 2000-quarter simulation after dropping 200
quarters. The variable gain CE model uses a 20-year (80-quarter) rolling sample period for computing
the perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿. Parameter values: ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
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